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ABSTRACT
Internet connectivity depends on contractual agreements be-
tween cooperating entities, such as administrative domains
(AD), where an agreement over a certain level of service is
made. Contracts (e.g., SLAs) for providing certain levels of
service must be enforceable, and ADs must have an incen-
tive to meet their contractual obligations. Previous work has
designed mechanisms for both pricing and network account-
ability, but no existing work examines contract structures
with respect to different accountability frameworks, and how
together they may affect an AD’s incentives to fulfill con-
tracts. We study how different contract structures—in par-
ticular, path-based versus pairwise contracts—affect ADs’
incentives to establish contracts (which, in turn, can affect
overall connectivity) and, once contracts are established, to
forward traffic according accordingly.
This paper presents several contributions. First, we derive
sufficient conditions for path-based contract systems and ac-
countability frameworks for entities to have an incentive to
forward traffic according to their contracts, provided that all
parties involved are rational. Second, we show that for path-
based contracts at equilibrium where nodes are encouraged
to fulfill their contracts, only a constant amount of moni-
toring is required for every participant to make a positive
profit; this is not the case for pairwise contracts. Third, we
show how systems that rely on pairwise contracts are prone
to depeering in presence of sufficient supply and demand
due to coarse granularity, a contractual failure that systems
which rely on path-based contracts are immune to. We pro-
pose modifications to pairwise contracts that could prevent
such failures. Finally, we present situations of depeering that
may be unpreventable due to maliciously behaving parties
for both pairwise and path-based contract structures. For
such scenarios, we show that while path-based contracts al-
low the sender of traffic to get reimbursed, this is not guar-
anteed in pairwise contract systems.
1. Introduction
Connectivity on the Internet has become a contractual
business bringing many ADs (contiguous network admin-
istered by a single authority [3] ) to cooperate via contrac-
tual agreements corresponding to desired service levels (e.g.,
SLA’s). In order to prevent ambiguity between cooperating
parties, obligations of the parties involved in the contracts
must be, first of all, rigorously defined. Also, contracts must
be enforceable and provide monetary incentives for partner-
ing ADs to meet contractual promises. Although pricing and
incentive mechanisms have been widely studied in the con-
text of network traffic routing (see [1,2,11,14,15,17,21,28]
for some examples), and although much work has been done
in the area of network accountability–mechanisms for moni-
toring ADs’ level of service and holding them accountable in
case of misbehavior (see [3–5, 12, 16] for some examples)–
the research community has not yet scrutinized pricing and
incentive mechanisms with respect to different accountabil-
ity frameworks. We believe this synthesis to be necessary for
successful network design because incentive mechanisms
by themselves do not guarantee reimbursement in cases of
misbehavior while accountability and enforcement by them-
selves do not guarantee monetary incentives for entities to
fulfill contracts in the first place. Below, we first provide
background information regarding incentive mechanism de-
sign and accountability, followed by a summary of our con-
tributions.
1.0.0.1 Background.
Two main methods for designing incentives are based on
either rewarding cooperative nodes [1, 2, 11, 21, 28] or pun-
ishing non-cooperative nodes [6, 18, 19]. However, incen-
tive mechanisms by themselves may not guarantee payment
to parties who have been denied what they were promised,
while punishments by themselves may not provide incen-
tives for participants to engage in relationships. Determining
what the price and/or penalty should be has been scrutinized
by the research community for various scenarios, but it is
not enough to design price and penalty structures without an
accountability framework sufficient for proving when an en-
tity deserves to get paid or penalized respectively in the first
place.
Enforcement mechanisms of contracts vary depending on
the type of accountability scheme used. Modeling the Inter-
net as a graph where nodes represent ADs and edges repre-
sent links between ADs, the ideal accountability framework
for enforcing contracts must be capable of monitoring qual-
ity of service of every node in the network. With node-level
accountability, it is straightforward to design incentives so
that every node meets contractual obligations: reward those
who meet them and penalize those who do not. Unfortu-
nately, no scheme accomplished this design other than as-
signing a trusted monitor for each node [16], and because of
that we mainly focus our study on link-level accountability
schemes which must be the next most accurate level of ac-
countability. In case of failure, link-level accountability de-
signs cannot do better than localize a pair of adjacent nodes
at least one of which must have not met its promises. Im-
plementing link-level accountability schemes is more prac-
tical [3, 5] than node-level accountability schemes, because
the former do not require presence of a trusted monitor at
each AD. However, designing incentives for the former is
more challenging than for the latter, because in link-level
settings nothing stops faulty nodes from lying and blaming
its neighbors for deviating from contractual obligations and
it is not at all clear which node on that link should be pun-
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ished and whether any node should be punished at all. Lo-
calization of a faulty link alone is not enough by itself be-
cause it does not guarantee reimbursement to parties whose
traffic suffered poor quality and it may result in depeering as
an outcome of a confrontation between the parties sharing
that link [24]. Along with network accountability, incentive
mechanisms must be used for parties forming contract rela-
tionships to have incentive to fulfill their contracts even in
cases when fault localization cannot be guaranteed at finer
than link-level granularity.
1.0.0.2 Summary of Contributions and Paper Out-
line.
In this study we define path-based and pairwise contracts
and, using node-level and link-level network accountability
schemes, we design mechanisms for network participants to
cooperate and forward each other’s traffic respecting con-
tractual obligations. More specifically,
An important aspect of our model is that contract estab-
lishment takes form of market proctored by a single au-
thority, who is a trusted and reliable entity in charge of
setting up as well as enforcing contracts between selfish
AD’s. With this model, we use path-based and pair-wise
contracts to study effectiveness of MINT [26] and BGP. An
AD can use path-based contracts to purchase a path to des-
tinations of that entity’s choice such that each node on that
path agrees to forward that entity’s bounded-rate traffic to
the next node on the path with particular quality. We are
motivated by recent progress in the study of path-based con-
nectivity [10, 26, 27] as it promises to provide more options
to users regarding level of service and more incentives for
networks to cooperate. Any two adjacent ADs can use pair-
wise contracts to form either peering relations in which they
agree to send each other traffic at a bounded rate and for-
ward each other’s traffic correctly or client-provider relations
where the provider agrees for a fixed price to forward cor-
rectly bounded-rate traffic from the client and forward to the
client traffic destined to it.
Our main contributions are as follows:
1. present sufficient conditions for path-based contract
systems and accountability frameworks that provide
incentive for intermediate networks to forward traffic
respecting contractual obligations in (Section 3.2.1,
Theorem 3.1);
2. present sufficient conditions for path-based and pair-
wise contract systems for every participant to make
a positive profit at equilibrium where participants are
discouraged from being faulty while requiring only a
constant amount of monitoring in (Section 3.2.2, The-
orem 3.2 and Section 3.3.3, Theorem 3.4);
3. when all entities are assumed to be rational, show that
pairwise contract systems, unlike path-based ones, suf-
fer from contractual failures—scenarios where avail-
able resources are not utilized in the presence sufficient
demand caused by depeering—due to coarse granular-
ity of pairwise contracts (Section 3.3) and propose
modifications to pairwise contracts for preventing such
failures (Section 3.3.3, Lemma 3);
4. discuss malicious behavior, where parties may behave
irrationally, that may result in depeering that may be
unpreventable in both pairwise and path-based contract
systems and show that path-based contracts allow the
source of traffic to get reimbursed, something that in
general cannot be guaranteed for pairwise contract sys-
tems in (Section 4.3).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
2 we develop our general model of the Internet, formally de-
fine pair-wise and path contracts, and provide formal defini-
tions of successful mechanism design with respect to node-
level and link-level accountability settings. Section 3, is de-
voted to presenting game theoretic analysis and equilibrium
evaluation of contract system. In Section 4, we evaluate
possible attacks that may occur in contract systems in case
of collusion, lack of information, and general distrust. In
Section 5 we discuss related work and we finish with a sum-
mary of contributions and a discussion of future challenges
in Section 6.
2. Model and Contracts
We model the Internet as a graph, where each node
represents a separate AD, and each edge represents a bi-
directional link. Prior to sending traffic to a destination, the
sender node must have first engaged in a contract with at
least the next node on the path to that destination during the
negotiations stage. We start this section with a general de-
scription of our model as a game and its participants as well
as notation useful in analyzing games that contract systems
may yield. Second, we define two contracts that network
participants may engage in to form contract systems. We
then present a full description of players’ strategies, payoffs,
and outcomes. To finalize this section, we present defini-
tions of successful mechanism design for contract systems
with respect to node-level accountability without a specific
payment structure and link-level accountability for propor-
tional and all-or-nothing payments.
2.1 Game Setup and Notation
Let us refer to any source AD who sends flows of batches
of data to various destinations as s. Each such flow b =
b1, b2, b3, ...bm going to some destination d through a set of
intermediary forwarding nodes Ps→d = n1, n2, ..., n` forms
a, possibly dynamic, flow path between s and d, where s is
indexed by 0 and d is indexed by ` + 1. s, n1≤i≤`, and d
comprise the set of players in our model (see Figure 1). We
assume that although every player is selfish, s can be trusted.
The players play a finitely repeated game that consists of two
stages (we ignore the initial innovation stage presented by
Laskowski and Chuang [16] as it is outside the scope of our
goals of providing incentives and enforcement for forward-
ing traffic):
1. Negotiations Stage, where all participants of the game
establish contracts;
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Figure 1: Basic game set up. Contract Mediator (CM) is in charge of
setting up flow paths and enforcing contracts. Thick lines represent
trusted channels.
2. Forwarding Stage, which consists of a finite number
of rounds such that per round each participant is al-
lowed to send an amount of traffic to an adjacent par-
ticipant no larger than the capacity of the link between
them, and, as long as this stage is not over, any batch of
packets received at round k, unless it reached its des-
tination, must be forwarded to the next node at round
k + 1.
We assume that s sends batches successively beginning at
the first round of the forwarding stage and that the length
of the forwarding stage permits the last batch in b to reach
d. The game is administered by a trusted party, the CM,
who is in charge of setting up as well as enforcing contracts
between participants during the negotiations and forwarding
stages respectively. The CM should ensure correct execution
of incentive mechanisms and guarantee accountability even
in cases with multiple independent adversaries. We assume
that every network participant has access to a trusted and
reliable out-of-band communication channel with the CM.
Prior to the forwarding stage, smust have established a busi-
ness relationship with at least n1, otherwise swill not be able
to send anything to d. All of notation for parameters we use
to represent and analyze contract systems is summarized in
Tables 1- 2.
We extend formal notation used to express quality of ser-
vice introduced in [16]. Let us represent network flow qual-
ity by a finite dimensional vector space Q, where each di-
mension represents a distinct network flow characteristic
such as transmission rate, expected packet delay, and loss
probability. We define a binary operator, ∗ : Q × Q → Q,
that is used to combine elements of Q. For each component
of q ∈ Q, ∗ operator represents an operation appropriate
to the network flow characteristic of that component. For
instance, for characteristics of maximum transmission rate
(bandwidth), expected packet delay, and throughput fraction,
∗ operator represents the min function, addition, and mul-
tiplication respectively. We can associate with each node
ni and each path Ps→d = (n1, n2, ..., n`) vectors qi ∈ Q
and qn1 ∗ qn2 ∗ ... ∗ qn` = qPs→d ∈ Q respectively.
Functionality of the ∗ operator can be used by the CM to
check the aggregate quality of any path throughout the game.
Operator ∗ for elements of Q × Ψ is defined as follows:
〈q, ψ〉∗〈q̃, ψ̃〉 = 〈q ∗ q̃, ψ||ψ̃〉,∀ q, q̃ ∈ Q and ∀ ψ, ψ̃ ∈ Ψ,
where || is the operation of concatenation. Here Ψ is the
space of all possible proofs that could support any element
Notation Explanation
Basic Setup (Section 2.1)
CM – contract mediator
s – source of traffic
d – destination of traffic
Ps→d – flow path from s to d
ni – ith forwarding node on Ps→d
` – total number of forwarding nodes on Ps→d
b – flow of batches of data
m – the number of batches that comprise b
bj – jth batch in b 1 ≤ j ≤ m
Used in Path-Segment and Pairwise-Exchange Contracts
T – contract duration (measured in rounds)
N/Ni – max batch size in general/node/neighbor i has bandwidth for per
round
ci – batch bandwidth cost of node/neighbor i for forwarding
Ci – monetary commitment to node/neighbor i for bandwidth over T
pi – penalty specification for node/neighbor i for not meeting
contractual obligations wrt a single batch
PrvsNdi – required next up-stream node to ni on the flow path
NxtNdi – required next down-stream node to ni on the flow path
Ψi – specification on how ni must form proofs of quality of service
νi – frequency ni of providing proofs for fulfilling contracts
ui – evaluator function of overall QoS of node/neighbor i
umini – minimum quality of network service of node/neighbor i
Used in Pairwise-Exchange Contracts Only
ej∈{0,1} – j
th neighbor
Tblj∈{0,1} – ej ’s routing table that defines how to forward ej̄ ’s traffic
More Negotiations Stage Params (Section 2.3.1)
ti min parts of a batch in b ni is required to forward
t min parts of a batch in b that must reach d for s to gain utility
ui utility s gains when at least t parts of bi reach d uncorrupted
pia ni’s penalty when unable to prove meeting ti
pib ni’s penalty when unable to prove that ni−1 does not meet ti−1
Table 1: Basic setup parameters (Section 2.1), parameters important
for the negotiation of Path-Segment and Pairwise-Exchange contracts
introduced in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 respectively, and additional
negotiation-strategy parameters introduced in Section 2.3.1.
of Q. Functionality of the ∗ operator can be used by the CM
to provably verify the aggregate quality of any path during
the forwarding stage. We define a function u : Q×Ψ → R
that can be used by the CM to reduce the evaluation of the
quality of a path to an analysis of a single real.
We elaborate on this notation with respect to our model
for some forwarding node ni. The duration of contracts T
is defined by the total number of rounds m + ` + 1, and
the frequency νi is once per round. Ψi should be provided
as specified by νi (once per round), however, participants
could agree to provide proofs of service for smaller val-
ues than the whole batch so that in case of partial failures
only a fraction of a batch may require retransmission. We
take the allowed delay across all the contracts to be the
time that lapses between rounds (assuming time synchro-
nization), and we assume that the size of every batch in b
is the same, is measured in packets, and is subject to nego-
tiation during the competition stage such that it is the batch
size, |bj | = N ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ m, that determines the maximum
desired rate of transmission, where the unit of time is a single
round. Since every forwarding node ni might be penalized
the same for forwarding less than ti packets, where N − ti
is the maximum allowed batch part loss agreed upon in ad-
vance, of a message as for delaying more thanN−ti packets
of a message for more than one round, there is no incentive
for any participant to forward traffic delayed for more than
one round; with this in mind, for each round and for each
batch, quality qi represents the amount of parts of that mes-
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Notation Explanation
Forwarding Stage Params (Section 2.3.1)
σ0 – probability of s sending a batch in b
σ1≤i≤`(ϕ) – probability that ni forwards ϕ parts of a batch in b
ϕi – number of parts of a batch in b ni forwards correctly
λia (ϕi) – probability ni claims to have sent ϕi parts to ni+1
λib (ϕi−1) – probability ni claims that ni−1 sent ϕi−1 parts to ni
Profit-Related Params (Sections 2.3.2- 2.3.3)
fi – marginal cost of forwarding a batch of ni
εx – minimum profit entity x is willing to settle for
πx – profit of entity x
Table 2: Parameters for forwarding-stage strategies and profits of
games contractual agreements yield, detailed in Sections 2.3.1 - 2.3.3.
sage participant ni forwards during that round, ui(qi, ψi)
evaluates to 1 if ti is met (provided that ψi checks out) and
0 otherwise, and umini is always 1.
2.2 Contract Setup
A contract is a set of agreements that must be estab-
lished during the negotiations stage. First, we describe the
Path-Segment contract, which is appropriate in relationships
when a source s wants to ensure that a forwarding node for-
wards s’s traffic with particular quality along an established
path. Second, we describe the Pairwise-Exchange contract,
which is appropriate to situations when two adjacent nodes
want to agree on the uses of the link that connects them. The
pairwise contract can be used to form contracts prevalent
in the current day Internet, namely client-service-provider
contract and peering contract. Although path contracts do
not address quality of a node’s incoming traffic, assuming
that every node, prior to sending any traffic, must have en-
gaged in a contract with respect to all of its outgoing traffic,
pairwise contract do address quality of incoming traffic for
client-service-provider and peering variations.
2.2.1 Path-Segment Contract
DEFINITION Path-Segment Contract A Path-Segment
Contract is an agreement between a source s and any
forwarding node ni ∈ Ps→d on parameters as specified in
in Table 1 above. 
We elaborate on some of the notation relevant to this con-
tract that is summarized in Table 1. νi is the frequency
with which ni must measure and provide 〈qni , ψni〉 to the
CM (i.e. νi divides T into rounds based on criteria such
as time or content volume), Ψi defines the appropriate ψni
for each possible qni , Ni defines the volume of traffic mea-
sured in data parts (assumed to be of the same size for every
participant) per time period specified by νi, Ci defines the
minimum amount s must pay to ni over the duration of the
contract, pi defines the various penalties for ni to pay s in
case of violation of various contractual agreements such as
νi and/or Ψi and/orNxtNdi, and/or umini . Over the course
of the contract ni must pay according to pi to s for every qjni
that it provides if ui(〈qjni , ψni〉) < umini , and s must pay
ci to ni when ui(〈qjni , ψni〉) ≥ umini for any outgoing flow
of s’s traffic for every round j.
MINT contracts [26] is an example of contracts that Path-
Segment contracts can model. During the negotiation stage,
the CM collects network advertisements from different for-
warding nodes and path requests from different sources. For-
warding node’s advertisements come in the form of offers
consisting of the quality of a particular network segment be-
ing offered and the price the advertiser of that segment is
willing to accept for that segment at that quality. A source’s
requests come in the form of bids consisting of the source
and the destination of a desired path, quality of that path,
and the price that source is willing to pay for a path at that
quality. Path quality can be measured in terms of available
bandwidth and maximum packet delay and/or max packet
loss, which we model with maximum allowed parts N and
minimum forwarded parts t1≤i≤` respectively (see Sections
2.1). When collection of advertised path segments forms
a path with the quality satisfies the source, the CM facili-
tates the establishment of Path-Segment contracts between
that source and each forwarding node on the desired path.
Source’s bid can be satisfied only if offers with sufficient
quality are available at a price not greater than the bid.
During the forwarding stage, the CM collects proofs of
and complaints about quality of service from different for-
warding nodes and sources, respectively. As a response to a
source’s complaint, the CM is responsible for administering
punishment when a forwarding node is not able to provide
proof of meeting contractual obligations. The CM is also
responsible ensuring that every forwarding node gets paid
respecting the contracts.
2.2.2 Pairwise-Exchange Contract
DEFINITION Pairwise-Exchange Contract A Pairwise-
Exchange Contract is an agreement between a pair of
neighbors (e1, e2) to exchange traffic via the link that
connects them respecting the parameters as specified in
Table 1. 
All the parameters in this contract are semantically identi-
cal to those defined in the Path-Segment contract except for
(Tbl1, T bl2), that specifies routing tables that define how e1
must forward e2’s traffic and vice versa based on that traffic’s
destination while respecting some notion of route optimality
predefined by the CM. Since this contract defines quality of
service of traffic flowing in both directions between e1 and
e2 we use subscripts to identify each parameter with its party,
e.g., c1 is bandwidth cost of e1 while C2 is e1’s commitment
to e2’s bandwidth.
During the negotiation stage, the CM establishes Tbl
for each node, proctors negotiation, and records Pairwise-
Exchange contracts between adjacent pairs of nodes who en-
gage in such contracts. The CM updates Tbl over the course
of the contracts when necessary. Because the CM is not re-
sponsible for monitoring overall path Ps→d quality for any s
and d, no source has control over the quality of any path dur-
ing the negotiations stage of the game. For any s and d the
quality of Ps→d is defined by Tbl and Pairwise-Exchange
contracts of each node and each edge on the path respec-
tively, and this quality may change over the course of the
forwarding stage of the game. During the forwarding stage,
responsibilities of the CM are analogous to those for Path-
Segment contracts.
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Adjacent nodes can peer with each other by establish-
ing symmetric Pairwise-Exchange contracts. Also, stub-
networks and end hosts can form customer-provider types
of relationships with provider ADs by forming asymmetric
Pairwise-Exchange contracts.
2.3 Strategies, Utilities, and Outcomes
In this section, we will mainly focus on describing strate-
gies, utilities, and outcomes of players for the link-level ac-
countability setting. We will also comment on how our de-
scription could be extended to the node-level accountability
setting.
2.3.1 Strategies
In this subsection we will define strategies of different
player for the negotiation and forwarding stages.
Negotiation Stage Strategies
During the negotiations stage, the strategy space of a for-
warding node ni on Ps→d consists of negotiating all possible
values of all parameters included in the contracts. All no-
tation required to follow negotiation-stage strategies is pre-
sented in Table 1. We focus on the most important param-
eters ci, Ci, ti and pi. For link-level accountability settings
we define p as penalties 〈pia , pib〉 that ni suffers when un-
able to prove either that ni met ti or that ni−1 did not meet
ti−1 respectively.
For node-level accountability, p is a single value corre-
sponding to pia in link-level accountability settings. The fol-
lowing is the strategy space of a forwarding node n1≤i≤` ∈
Ps→d when negotiating with the source s or any other for-
warding node in Ps→d:
1. adjust the price of an advertised segment by:
(a) adjusting bandwidth cost ci while keeping adver-
tised bandwidth |b1≤j≤m| = N and threshold ti
constant or
(b) adjusting N while keeping ci and ti constant or
(c) adjusting ti while keeping Ni and ci constant;
2. adjust commitment Ci for bandwidth Ni;
3. adjust penalties pia and pib .
The CM does not conclude the negotiations until pur-
chasers of bandwidth from ni commit by providing the CM
with Ci. The CM should check and distribute these commit-
ments to sellers of bandwidth prior to the forwarding stage.
Forwarding Stage Strategies
For each batch in b, each forwarding node ni in Ps→d has
an option of forwarding a number ϕi of parts of that batch
to the next forwarding node in Ps→d with probability given
by a discrete random variable σi. The source s sends each
batch in b with probability σ0, and we assume that this prob-
ability is identical and independent for each batch. For every
batch bj , ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ m, s gains utility uj if some minimum
number of parts t of bj make it to d and 0 otherwise. If less
than t parts of a batch reach d, then the source s may gain
utility via a reimbursement from entities that did not fulfil
their contracts. The thresholds are set up such that for any
i < j, ti ≥ tj , t0 = N and t` = t. No node ni is responsi-
ble for forwarding a batch in b if it can show that it received
less than ti−1 parts of that batch the previous round. The fol-
lowing assumptions are important for analysis contract sys-
tems.
ASSUMPTION 1 (UNINTENTIONAL DROPS). The differ-
ence between thresholds ti and ti+1 of adjacent forwarding
nodes ni and ni+1 reflects the amount of parts ni+1 may
unintentionally drop in the worst case congestion.
ASSUMPTION 2 (INDEPENDENCE). Any number of parts
that a node unintentionally drops due to congestion is inde-
pendent of every other number of parts that node may unin-
tentionally drop due to congestion.
ASSUMPTION 3 (PERFECT LAST LINK). The destination
always receives everything that the last node n` in Ps→d
forwards to d.
While the unintentional drop assumption allows us to as-
sume that no more than N − t parts of any batch in b get
unintentionally dropped along Ps→d, the independence as-
sumption allows us to express probability of a union of part-
drop events as a sum of probabilities of those events. Lastly,
we assume that the link between the destination and the last
node n` is perfect, and this assumption allows us to simplify
profit analysis of participants presented in Section 3.
In the link-level setting, when a node ni does not forward
at least ti parts of a batch in b, it has the option of lying
by claiming receipt and shipment of ϕi−1 < ti and ϕi ≥
ti parts of that batch with probability λib(ϕi−1 < ti) and
λia(ϕi ≥ ti) respectively. For our study, we assume the
following rule:
DEFINITION Claiming Shipment Rule At no round is a
forwarding node n1≤i≤` allowed to claim that it meets ti
for any batch bj ∈ b unless it proves receipt of at least ti−1
parts of bj from ni−1 the previous round. 
This rule is useful in analyzing incentives in link-level ac-
countability settings as it provides incentive for forwarding
nodes to issue acknowledgments of receipt. For ni, the value
of λ(i+1)b(ϕi) signifies the probability with which ni+1 ac-
knowledges the receipt of ϕi parts from ni.
For every round, the strategy space for a forwarding node
n1≤i≤` in Ps→d for every ti−1 parts of every batch in b that
ni receives from ni−1 is:
1. Comply by forwarding ϕi ≥ ti parts of that batch to
the next node in Ps→d, thereby acknowledging receipt
of at least ti−1 parts of that batch from ni−1 the previ-
ous round;
2. Trick by forwarding t ≤ ϕi ≤ ti parts of that batch
to the next node in Ps→d (only applicable to link-level
settings with all-or-nothing payments);
3. Cheat by dropping the batch entirely and, exclusively
(a) either lie about not receiving at least ti−1 parts of
that batch
(b) or lie about forwarding at least ti parts of that
batch to the next node in Ps→d (this requires from
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ni proof of receipt of at least ti−1 parts of that
batch from ni−1 the previous round).
Note that for link-level settings with proportional pay-
ments, if a node does not meet its threshold, then it is not
going to forward anything to avoid extra forwarding costs
since it in this case it will get penalized anyway.
The strategy spaces of the source node s for each batch in
b and destination node d for each batch it receives from n`
are respectively:
(1) σ0 = 1: to send the whole batch along Ps→d;
(2) σ0 = 0: to send no part of the batch along Ps→d;
and
(1) to confirm receipt of ϕ` parts of that batch;
(2) to lie about receiving ϕ` parts of that batch.
Since in node-level accountability settings no node can lie
about its performance, a forwarding node’s strategy space in
this case is either to meet its threshold or to drop the message
entirely.
2.3.2 Utilities
All material utility is gained and/or lost during the for-
warding stage of the game. Because bandwidth is commit-
ted to its purchasers via the CM for the entire duration of the
forwarding stage, payments and reimbursements in forms of
penalties are proctored by the CM for every participant of
the game per every round where applicable. Every node
n1≤i≤` experiences a marginal cost of fiN for forwarding a
single part of any batch in b. Below we summarize profit
of a forwarding node n1≤i≤`, for every batch in b, for link-
level accountability settings with payments proportional to
the amount of parts forwarded and all-or-nothing payments
respectively. Note that for the latter setting punishment is
administered only when ϕ` < t.
Payments Proportional to ϕi:
1. +ϕiN (ci − fi) for forwarding ϕi ≥ ti of that batch and
able to prove shipment of ϕi packets of that batch;
2. −(ϕiN fi + pia) for forwarding ϕi ≥ ti parts of that
batch when unable to prove shipment of ϕi packets of
that batch;
3. −pib for dropping the batch entirely and lying about
not receiving it or lying about sending it at least ti parts
of that batch to ni+1 while unable to prove receipt of at
least ti−1 parts of that batch the previous round from
ni−1;
4. −pia for dropping the batch entirely and lying about
sending it at least ti parts of that batch to ni+1 and
able to prove receipt of at least ti−1 parts of that batch
the previous round from ni−1
5. −pib when unable to prove lack of shipment on the part
of ni−1 of at least ti−1 the previous round.
All-or-Nothing Payments:
1. +( tiN ci−
ϕi
N fi) for forwarding ϕi packets of that batch
when either able to prove shipment of at least ti parts
of that batch to ni+1 or ϕ` ≥ t;
2-5. are the same as in settings with payments proportional
to the amount of parts forwarded with the additional
requirement that ϕ` must be less than t.
For node-level settings, for every batch in b that any par-
ticipant ni sees, provided that it receives at least ti−1 pack-
ets of that message the previous round from ni−1, ni makes
ϕi
N (ci − fi) and for ci −
ϕi
N fi for forwarding ϕi ≥ ti parts
of that batch for proportional and all-or-nothing payments
respectively. If ϕi < ti, then ni gets penalized pi.
For both node-level and link-level accountability settings
alike, source’s utility is the sum of utilities of batches that
make it to d containing at least t parts. Destination does
not have any utility in this game unless in the node-level
accountability settings, but, in the link-level accountability
settings, if it is suspected that ϕ` ≥ t but d intentionally
does not acknowledge receipt of at least t parts of a batch in
b from n`, d will be penalized p(`+1)2 .
2.3.3 Outcomes
The outcome of the negotiation state is a vector
of quadruples 〈{c1, C1, t1,p1}, {c2, C2, t2,p2}, . . . ,
{cn, Cn, tn,pn}〉 that specifies for every forwarding node
ni ∈ Ps→d bandwidth cost of forwarding a single
batch, overall bandwidth commitment, minimum forward
threshold and penalties for not meeting contractual obli-
gations. The outcome of the forwarding stage is a vec-
tor 〈 〈ϕ11 , ϕ12 , . . . , ϕ1m〉, 〈ϕ21 , ϕ22 , . . . , ϕ2m〉, . . . ,
〈ϕ`1 , ϕ`2 , . . . , ϕ`m〉, 〉 that summarizes forwarding action
ϕij of n1≤i≤` with respect to each batch bj ∈ b and a vector
〈πs, πn1 , πn2 , . . . , πn` , πd〉 that summarizes profit of each
entity in Ps→d.
The desirable outcome is an equilibrium at which traffic is
forwarded respecting the thresholds and each entity makes
at least its minimum settlement–minimum profit an entity is
willing to settle for. More concretely, the desirable outcome
is when ϕij ≥ ti ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ m, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ `, πni >
εni ∀ 0 ≤ i ≤ ` + 1 and no entity in Ps→d can gain by
unilateral deviation.
2.4 Successful Mechanism Design
For these definitions and analysis of contract systems with
respect to these definitions we assume that no node has hid-
den utility for doing malice that cannot be accounted for with
penalties.
DEFINITION Faulty We say that a forwarding node is
faulty if it fails to meet at least one of its contractual obli-
gations. 
DEFINITION Success, Node-level A mechanism design
for a contract system that forms a path Ps→d is successful
with Node-Level Accountability, when all of the following
are true:
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1. During Negotiations Stage: The CM can guarantee that
for no participant is it profitable to advertise bandwidth
it does not have;
2. During Forwarding Stage: for every round over the du-
ration T of the contract, for every participant A, for ev-
ery participant B who has contractual obligations to A,
the CM can guarantee that B gets paid at least C from
A and A gets reimbursed from B when B is faulty;
3. At Equilibrium: The CM can guarantee that if there ex-
ists an available path Ps→d such that s’s overall utility
obtained when its traffic is treated with particular qual-
ity of service along Ps→d is no lower than s’s marginal
costs for using Ps→d in addition to s’s minimum set-
tlement εs, then there exists an equilibrium such that
(a) during the negotiations stage, the CM is capable
of constructing a contract system forming a path
Ps→d that satisfies that particular quality of ser-
vice and ensures that minimum settlement of ev-
ery forwarding node on Ps→d is met
(b) during the forwarding stage, for no node on Ps→d
is it profitable to be faulty with respect to s’s traf-
fic.

Node-level accountability may be very appealing as it
guarantees that any source will always be able to detect
the node(s) responsible for failure(s) for Path-Segment as
well as Pairwise-Exchange contracts. However, guarantee-
ing success in such a setting presents an impractical task in
the context of real-world networks because it is hard to prov-
ably localize the faulty node unless there is a mechanism ca-
pable of providing proofs regarding the quality of service of
each forwarding node in the system. As we have already
mentioned, having a trusted monitor with ability to observe
the quality of every node, as proposed in [16], will solve the
problem of network accountability trivially, but such solu-
tion is impractical. We describe an idea of approaching this
issue more efficiently in our technical report [29]. It must be
noted that none of the network accountability frameworks
proposed in [3, 5, 16] satisfies our definition of success with
node-level accountability for Path-Segment contract systems
because neither scheme guarantees localization of the exact
faulty forwarding node(s) in the network with multiple inde-
pendent adversaries. Localization of a faulty link – a pair of
neighboring entities one of which must be the faulty one – is
the most accurate result that solutions proposed in [3, 5] can
provide.
DEFINITION Success, Link-level, Proportional A mech-
anism design for a contract system that forms a path Ps→d is
successful with Link-Level Accountability and Payments
Proportional to the Amount of Parts Forwarded, when
all of the following are true.
1. During Negotiations Stage: Same as in Definition 2.4;
2. During Forwarding Stage: for every round over the
duration T of the contract, for every participant A
∈ Ps→d, for every participant B ∈ Ps→d who has con-
tractual obligations to A: the CM can guarantee that B
gets paid at least C from A, B gets paid the proportion
of c that respects the amount of parts that it forwarded
when it is not faulty in addition to C, and A gets re-
imbursed from B and/or B’s adjacent neighbor when
either B or that adjacent neighbor is faulty;
3. At Equilibrium: Same as in node-level success defini-
tion. 
DEFINITION Success, Link-level, All-or-nothing A
mechanism design for a contract system that forms a path
Ps→d is successful with Link-Level Accountability and
All-or-Nothing Payments, when all of the following are
true.
1. During Negotiations Stage: Same as in Definition 2.4.
2. During Forwarding Stage: for every round over the
duration T of the contract, for every participant A
∈ Ps→d, for every B ∈ Ps→d who has contractual obli-
gations to A, the CM can guarantee that B gets paid
at least C from A, A gets reimbursed from B and/or
Bs adjacent neighbor when the overall quality of Ps→d
does not meet the overall quality of service aggregated
over every B with contractual obligations to A and ei-
ther B or that adjacent neighbor is faulty;
3. At Equilibrium: Same as in node-level success defini-
tion with the addition that at equilibrium during the for-
warding stage the CM should not have to check more
than a constant number of proofs of quality of service.

While the first definition of successful mechanism design
for contract systems with link-level accountability requires
that each forwarding node meets contractual obligations, the
second definition of successful mechanism design for con-
tract systems with link-level accountability only requires
that the desired overall path quality is met. The purpose to
have proportional payments is to provide each node with in-
centive to forward as much as possible, thereby increasing
the chances that the overall path quality is met. However, a
mechanism that satisfies the second definition is more practi-
cal than a mechanism that can satisfy only the first one from
a computational point of view because with the second defi-
nition, as long as the desired overall path quality is met, there
is no need to check quality of service of each node on the
path at equilibrium. The definition of successful mechanism
design for contract systems with node-level accountability
does not assume any payment structure, but it can be eas-
ily extended to settings where payments are proportional to
the amount of parts forwarded as well as all-or-nothing pay-
ments analogously to definitions of successful mechanism
design for contract systems with node-level accountability.
Neither of the weak settings is as appealing as the strong
setting because in former settings a source cannot localize
the exact faulty node. Due to this, no source is able to pe-
nalize the faulty node unless one is willing to punish both
nodes sharing the faulty edge, which does not suit Pairwise-
Exchange contract establishments at all. Although in such
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settings every source is guaranteed at least not to waste funds
on faulty nodes, the fact that a source may potentially pun-
ish an innocent forwarding node that just happened to be
adjacent to a faulty node along the path of that source’s
traffic is an important weakness that may discourage some
parties from establishing contracts with that source in the
first place. Also, in Pairwise-Exchange establishments even
if an emitter’s traffic is completely ignored by its receiver,
the emitter still must pay that receiver C because the emit-
ter cannot prove anything about what it sent. However, the
weak settings are more applicable to real world networks
than the strong setting, and practical schemes for localiza-
tion of faulty edges have already been proposed [3, 5] for
networks with a single adversary.
3. Contract System Analysis
In this section, we show how different contract systems
perform with respect to success definitions described in Sec-
tion 2.4 for contract systems with link-level accountability
for proportional and all-or-nothing payments. First, we an-
alyze honesty during the negotiations stage, followed by ac-
countability during the forwarding stage for path-based as
well as pairwise contract systems. We then continue with a
formal treatment of participant profit model, state conditions
sufficient for Path-Segment contracts satisfy both link-level
success definitions, show how Pairwise-Exchange contract
systems satisfy neither of link-level success definitions and
propose modifications to Pairwise-Exchange contracts that
could make systems based on the latter meet link-level suc-
cess definitions. For all of our analysis we assume that band-
width may be purchased in any denomination. Analysis of
Path-Segment contract systems with node-level accountabil-
ity is presented in our technical report [29].
3.1 Honesty and Accountability
The negotiation stage is not over until an equilibrium—a
point where no player gains by adjusting any of the param-
eters for any of the contracts that player is engaged in—-
is reached. The challenge of preventing players from lying
about true costs of their goods has already been addressed
[2,9,11,20], so we do not focus on this issue. To discourage
players from advertising bandwidth they do not have during
the negotiations stage the CM must ensure that the gains a
forwarding node obtains from advertising bandwidth it does
not have must be less than the penalties that node will suf-
fer upon failing to meet contractual obligations. In Sections
3.2 and 3.3, we show that this is a necessary condition for
the source to send any traffic, and in Section 4.2 we present
mechanisms for specifying the penalties to ensure that nodes
are discouraged from dropping traffic and making false ad-
vertisements (see 4.1 for an attack).
Our study does not focus on the implementation details of
various accountability frameworks. We assume that node-
level and link-level accountability frameworks that function
correctly in the presence of multiple independent adversaries
exist. Assuming only a single adversary, as is done in [5,16],
is a weakness because every node on a path, being selfish and
rational, can be a potential adversary. Our analysis mostly
focuses on link-level accountability settings, and our mech-
anism for proving an entity’s quality of service are based pri-
marily on that entity obtaining proof of receipt from the next
entity down the stream. The proofs of receipt must be un-
forgeable (see our technical report for details [29]). Proofs
of receipt can be collected by the CM via an out-of-band
trusted channel that we assume every participant has with
the CM.
3.2 Success of Path-Segment Contracts
In this section we analyze Path-Segment contract systems
with respect to link-level accountability for two types of pay-
ments: proportional and all-or-nothing. We show that Path-
Segment systems meet both link-level success definitions.
The proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 and Theorems 3.1 and 3.2
are presented in our technical report [29].
3.2.1 Proportional Payments
When every forwarding node is encouraged to forward as
much traffic as possible, the probability of at least t parts of
each batch in b to reach d is higher. This is the motivation
for studying systems with proportional payments, where the
more a forwarding node forwards the more it gets paid. To
show that Path-Segment contract systems satisfy definition
of successful mechanism design with link-level accountabil-
ity and proportional payments, we are going to analyze the
expected profit of forwarding nodes and the source to find
scenarios where s’s traffic reaches d, and s and every for-
warding node make positive profit.
When an agreement is reached in the negotiations stage,
source s makes a commitment Ci = mci tiN to every for-
warding node ni, and s pays ciN for each extra part that ni
forwards beyond ti. The expected profit of a forwarding
node ni is:






+ ξi1 · ci
]
− [ξi2 · fi + ξi3 · pia +
σi(0|ϕi−1 ≥ ti−1)[λia(ϕi ≥ ti)pia +
λib(ϕi−1 < ti−1)pib ] +




















This equation is the difference between what ni is ex-
pected to earn by exceeding threshold ti when ni+1 ac-
knowledges ni’s forwarding actions during forwarding stage
in addition to what ni gains from s’s commitment to
ni’s bandwidth in the negotiations stage and ni’s expected
marginal forwarding costs in addition to expected penalties
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when ni is unable to prove that it meets contractual obliga-
tions. Sufficient condition for ni to forward traffic and make
positive profit is for the gains that ni makes from proper for-
warding of s’s traffic to be larger than the losses it may incur
due to forwarding costs and penalties. Recall that if a node
does not meet its threshold, then it is not going to forward
anything to avoid extra forwarding costs since in this case it
it gets penalized anyway. An important aspect of E[πni ] is
that the profit of ni depends on the strategies of its neighbors.
There is nothing ni can do if ni−1 lies about forwarding at
least ti−1 parts, and if ni does not have any confidence in
ni+1, then ni would forward nothing to prevent fruitless for-
warding costs. Therefore, a sufficient incentive mechanism
must provide ni with confidence in its neighbors, specifi-
cally for ni to be sure that ni+1 acknowledges everything
that ni forwards to ni+1.
The expected profit of the source s is:




















σi(0|ϕi−1 ≥ ti−1)(λia(ϕi ≥ ti)[pia +
p(i+1)b ] + λib(0|ϕi−1 ≥ ti−1) ·
[p(i−1)a + pib ]).
This equation is the difference between what s is expected
to earn from penalties of forwarding nodes in Ps→d when
they are unable to prove that they meet contractual obliga-
tions in addition to the expected overall utility of batches in
b reaching d and what s is expected to pay to all forwarding
nodes s has Path-Segment contract with when they exceed
their respective thresholds in addition to s’s commitment to
their bandwidth. If s has high confidence in that ϕ` ≥ t, then
it is sufficient for
∑m





s to send traffic and make positive profit. If s has no confi-
dence in that ϕ` ≥ t, and say at least one forwarding node
found that it is best for it not to forward; without loss of gen-
erality let ni be the faulty node closest to s (note that there
could be multiple faulty nodes on a path, but the closest node
drops all the traffic). Then s can still have incentive to send












λia(ϕi ≥ ti)[pia + p(i+1)b ] + λib(0)[p(i−1)a + pib ].
To ensure that s can make positive profit, the CM must en-
force penalties to be higher than all of s’s expected marginal
costs over the whole path Ps→d (see Section 4.2 for further
detail), which means that every node’s penalty must be at
least its forwarding cost. This condition ensures that for no
node will it be profitable to advertise bandwidth it does not
have, assuming that no forwarding node ni will agree to a
bandwidth cost ci lower than its forwarding cost fi. If we
assume that s is trusted, then pia should be higher than all
of s’s expected marginal costs. Equation for E[πs] shows
that s might have incentive to send less than N towards d in
case σ`(ϕ` > t|ϕ0 < N) is consistently close to 1. This is
because, while obtaining only a constant utility uj for each
batch bj ∈ b when at least t parts of bj reach d, s must pay
each forwarding node ni extra for each part of bj that ni for-
wards in excess of ti parts. However, by the Claiming Ship-
ment Rule (see Section 2.3.1) in this scenario n1 would not
be able to get paid which would cause it drop every batch to
prevent fruitless forwarding costs. From penalties, s would
not be able to profit at least its minimum settlement εs due to
the structure of penalties as presented in Section 4.2. There-
fore, being rational, s would rather send out exactly N parts
for each batch.
The following results summarize success of Path-
Exchange contracts with respect to definitions of successful
mechanism design for contract systems with link-level ac-
countability and proportional payments.
LEMMA 1. If d is trusted or encouraged with payment
εd
m to acknowledge receipt of ϕ` parts from n`, this in-
formation is known to every participant, and
∑m
i=1 ui ≥∑`+1
i=0 εi + m
∑`
i=1 fi, then there is an equilibrium band-
width price setting c = 〈c1, c2, ..., c`〉 such that at least t
parts of every batch in b reach d in the expected case and
each element of Ps→d makes a positive profit no less than its
respective minimum settlement.
Lemma 1 satisfies the last part of the definition of suc-
cessful mechanism design with link-level accountability and
proportional payments, and the first two parts of this defini-
tion have already been addressed in Section 3.1.
THEOREM 3.1. Path-Segment contract systems meet defini-
tion of successful mechanism design with link-level account-
ability and proportional payments.
Theorem 3.1 shows that for Path-Segment contract sys-
tems, when every forwarding node is encouraged to forward
all traffic as per the contract, at least t parts of each batch in
b will reach d in the expected case. However, accountabil-
ity systems that require to check quality level of each node
are inefficient, which is why an accountability system that
requires only a constant amount of checking is preferred.
3.2.2 All-or-Nothing Payments
The motivation for studying systems with all-or-nothing
payments comes from the goal of decreasing the CM’s work-
load by focusing on the overall path efficiency as opposed
the efficiency of each node. Overall path efficiency is easier
to verify at equilibrium by checking quality of the last link
in flow path.
In this scenario, everything is the same as in the scenario
with link-level accountability described in the previous sub-
section with the exception that punishment is administered
only when the amount of parts n` forwards ϕ` is less that
overall path threshold t and payment is not proportional to
the amount of parts forwarded. We will perform the same
analysis as for the scenario with proportional payments.
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When an agreement is reached in the negotiations stage,
s commits mci tiN to every forwarding node ni. As long as
ϕ` ≥ t, every node ni gets paid a fixed bandwidth cost ci tiN ,
otherwise each node ni has to prove that it met its thresh-
old ti in order to get paid. Note the use of Assumption 2
(independence) for profit analysis. The expected profit of
forwarding node ni is :







− [ξi1 + ξi2 +
mσi(0|ϕi−1 ≥ ti−1)[λia(ϕi ≥ ti) ·
pia + λib(ϕi−1 < ti−1)pib ] +
mσi−1(ϕi−1 < ti−1)λ(i−1)1(ϕi−1 ≥ ti−1)pib ],






























and ξi2 = m
ti−1∑
ϕi=t
σi(ϕi)(λia(ϕi ≥ ti)pia +

























This equation is very similar to the one for proportional
payments; the differences are that a node’s gain is fixed to
the commitment and that node’s losses due to penalties de-
pend on whether the final node n` meets its threshold t. Just
as in the scenario with proportional payments, sufficient con-
dition for ni to forward traffic and make positive profit is for
the gains that ni makes from forwarding to be larger than the
losses it may incur due to penalties. Besides ni’s confidence
in its neighbors, ni’s confidence in whether σ`(ϕ` > t) is
high is important. If σ`(ϕ` > t) is high, ni may be encour-
aged to forward t ≤ ϕi ≤ ti in order to prevent extra losses
due to forwarding. Therefore, sufficient incentive mecha-
nism must provide ni with confidence in its neighbors and
make it unprofitable to economize on forwarding costs.
Expected profit equation of s is:














σ`(ϕ` < t) m
∑̀
i=1
σi(ϕi < ti|ϕi−1 ≥ ti−1) ·
(λia(ϕi ≥ ti)[pia + p(i+1)b ] + λib(ϕi−1 < ti−1) ·
[p(i−1)a + pib ]).
The main difference between this equation and that of
source’s profit in the proportional payments case is that in
the case of all-or-nothing payments the source does not have
to pay to forwarding nodes more than the commitment and
failure is addressed only if n` does not meet t. If s has
high confidence in that ϕ` ≥ t, then it is sufficient for∑m




N for s to send traffic and make
positive profit. If s has no confidence in that ϕ` ≥ t, and say
at least one forwarding node found that it is best for it not
to forward anything at all; without loss of generality let the
closest faulty node to s be ni. Then s can still have incentive







λia(ϕi ≥ ti)[pia+p(i+1)b ]+λib(ϕi−1 < ti−1)[p(i−1)a+pib ].
Just as in the scenario with proportional payments, to en-
sure that s can makes positive profit, the CM must enforce
penalties to be higher than all of s’s expected marginal costs
over the whole path Ps→d.
LEMMA 2. If d is trusted or encouraged with payment
εd
m to acknowledge receipt of ϕ` parts from n`, pia <





i=0 εi + m
∑`
i=1 fi, then
there are equilibrium bandwidth price and penalty settings
c = 〈c1, c2, ..., c`〉 and p1 = 〈p11 , p21 , ..., p`1〉, respectively,
such that exactly t parts of every batch in b reach d, each el-
ement of Ps→d makes a positive profit no less than its corre-
sponding minimum settlement, and the CM only has to check
a single proof of receipt, namely, proof that ϕ` = t provided
by d, per round.
Lemma 1 satisfies the last part of the definition of suc-
cessful mechanism design with link-level accountability and
all-or-nothing payments, and the first two parts of this defi-
nition have already been addressed.
THEOREM 3.2. Path-Segment contract systems meet defini-
tion of successful mechanism design with link-level account-
ability and all-or-nothing payments.
3.3 Failure of Pairwise-Exchange Contracts
In Pairwise-Exchange contract systems source’s utility is
defined the same way as in the Path-Segment contract sys-
tems, but we also need to introduce the utility uni of each
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forwarding node ni ∈ Ps→d which ni gains when its re-
ceiver on path Ps→d (i. e. ni+1) meets contractual obliga-
tions. For our analysis we are going to assume that uni is
defined as the payment ci tiN which ni receives from ni−1
when the former can prove to the latter that ni forwarded a
batch in b correctly. We also assume that uni is the same
for each batch in b for all forwarding nodes in the game
except for the source s. un0 = 0 because source s does
not gain anything when n1 forwards a batch bj ∈ b of s to
n2 (unless ` = 1 in which case un0 is defined according
to u1≤j≤m), unless at least t packets of bj make it to d, in
which case s gains uj . We see that
∑m
j=1 uj > mc1+εs and
ci−fi ≥ ci+1+εni ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ `−1 are necessary conditions
for s’s traffic to reach d. Below, we analyze two scenarios
where Pairwise-Exchange contract systems fail due to prob-
lems that stem from these necessary conditions. The first
problem arises due to inaccuracies of estimation of traffic
patterns on the Internet and how such inaccuracies propa-
gate given the second necessary condition above, while the
second problem arises due to inability of AD requesting con-
nectivity to negotiate traffic service level separately for each
destination. By contractual failure we refer to the scenario
where s has enough funds to pay each node along an avail-
able (bandwidth up for sale) flow path to d at least that node’s
minimum settlement in addition to the forwarding cost, but s
is unable to reach d due to depeering along that path, which
is defined as follows.
DEFINITION Depeering Depeering of adjacent nodes A
and B is an agreement made during the negotiations stage
to not exchange any traffic during the forwarding stage. 
We conclude this section with a presentation of necessary
and sufficient requirements for Pairwise-Exchange contracts
to avoid contractual failures and satisfy both link-level suc-
cess definitions. Proofs of Lemma 3 and Theorems 3.3 and
3.4 are sketched in our technical report [29].
3.3.1 Depeering Due to Traffic Estimation Error
Accurate estimation of traffic patterns on the Internet is
difficult task, and in this subsection we show how errors
made during traffic estimation can result in contractual fail-
ures. Consider a scenario depicted in Figure 1. Bandwidth
costs c1≤i≤` are per batch of size N . For this example we
assume that s is the only traffic generator. Considering the
necessary conditions for traffic to flow in Pairwise-Exchange
contract systems mentioned above it must be the case that
ci − fi ≥
∑`
j=i+1 cj + εni ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ ` to account for
all marginal costs of ni. Thus, when s is the only genera-
tor of traffic and s wants to send a batch to d, s must spend
at least f1 +
∑`
j=2 cj + εn1 whether Ps→d was formed via
Pairwise-Exchange or Path-Segment contracts, where f1 is
n1’s marginal cost for forwarding a batch of size N . Now,
let us say that s changes its destination of interest to some
n1<i<`. When Ps→d is formed via Pairwise-Exchange con-
tracts, for delivering a batch to the new destination s could
be required to pay n1 no less than f1 +
∑i−1
j=2 cj + εn1 and
f1 +
∑`
j=2 cj + εn1 if ni−1 does and does not account for
the fact that ni−1 does not need to pay ni to route s’s traffic
in this situation respectively. Such a correction is subject to
contract negotiation between ni−2 and ni−1 and is feasible
in our model.
In a more complex situation, say s wants to deliver ap-
proximately Y% of its traffic to ni and the rest to d over
a period of time long enough for ni−1 to notice this distri-
bution. This distribution may change from game to game
(negotiations and forwarding stages repeated many times).
Even though s cannot specify its flow distribution, ni−1
can try to estimate it over time with some error ±δ rep-
resenting maximal deviation and charge ni−2 for expected
Y ± δ% of traffic that needs to go through ni+1. More re-
alistically, since ni−1 is selfish, it is in its best interest to
always overestimate the amount of traffic that flows through
ni and charge ni−2 for Y + δ% of traffic, which is the max-
imal amount of traffic s may send to d. In real world sce-
nario with many different flows, ni−1 could allocate Y +δ%
worth of bandwidth to prevent congestion in case volume
of traffic from s to d does reach Y + δ%. Assuming that
every forwarding node’s penalty for not meeting contrac-
tual obligations is high enough to prevent lying about re-
sources during the negotiations stage (see Section 3.1 for
detail), this overestimation will propagate to s as required
by the necessary conditions mentioned above. Although it
is in the best interest of every n1≤j≤i−1 to overestimate, for
simplicity we will assume that only ni−1 overestimates in
this example (the final result without this simplification is











j=1 cj per batch











when δ > 0. We see that if at negotiations stage of some
repetition of the game s’s overall utility for having ex-
actly Y% of its traffic delivered to ni and the rest to d is








j=1 cj + εs, then s and
n1 will depeer. This result can be easility extended to the
case where every node overestimates traffic more expensive
traffic and underestimates cheaper traffic.
The problem of estimation error propagation is not an is-
sue in path-based contract systems because in such systems
s can negotiate each flow with each forwarding node sepa-
rately.
3.3.2 Depeering Due to Flow Inseparability
In Pairwise-Exchange contracts, unlike in Path-Segment
contracts, negotiations are coarse grained; AD requesting
connectivity cannot negotiate traffic service level for each
destination separately because traffic to all destinations is
treated equal under Pairwise-Exchange Contracts. In this
section we show how such coarse granularity may result in
contractual failure. Consider the scenario depicted in Fig-
ure 2. In this situation node X is a service provider for n
sources s1, s2, . . . , sn. Every source wants to send 1 unit of
traffic to the next hop of each of D1 and D2 which are ser-
vice providers for X . D1 is also a service provider of s0.
Utilities of the sources are as follows:

























Figure 2: Setup where depeering may occur due to inseparability of
flows between adjacent nodes during negotiations stage.
where εD1s1 > ε
D2
s1 ;
• usi→D1 ≈ 0 and usi→D2 = c2n + cx + ε
D2
si ∀ 1 < i ≤
n.
Here εDjsi is the minimum profit si can settle for when
buying connectivity to Dj . The negotiations in this exam-
ple start with s0. None of the players knows us0 , but s0
offers D1 to purchase all of its bandwidth at a bandwidth
cost of c0n per unit. With such leverage, D1 offers X n units
of bandwidth at a price of c1 = c0n + δ
′ per unit for some
δ′ > 0. D2 offers X n units of bandwidth at a price of c2n
per unit. To its clients, X advertises access to D1 and D2,
and through negotiation X figures out what each si is will-
ing to pay. These a advertisements are subject to contract
negotiations between X and s1≤i≤n and are feasible in our
model. Considering thatX charges cx per unit of bandwidth
to cover forwarding costs and make positive profit respecting
X’s minimum settlement, the most X could make is:
(n− 1)(c2
n
+ cx) + c1 + cx − nc1 − c2 =
c2 + ncx −
c2
n





However, were X to advertise access to only D2, X’s




+ cx)− c2 = c2 + ncx − c2 = ncx.
Assuming that X’s penalty for not meeting contractual
obligations is high enough to prevent X from lying about
its resources during the negotiations stage (see Section 3.1
for detail), when n ≥ 1 it is rational for X and D1 to depeer.
This is unfortunate for s1 considering the facts that s1 would
rather send 1 unit of traffic to a destination one hop after D1
than to a destination one hope after D2 and s1’s utility al-
lows s1 to pay X and D1 for a path going through them.
Such problem could not be an issue in path-based contract
systems because in such systems s can negotiate each flow
with each forwarding node separately.
3.3.3 Modifications to Pairwise-Exchange Contracts
While Path-Segment contract systems provide the source
with more options over the quality of the path than Pairwise-
Exchange contract systems do, the former result in much
higher penalties for long paths and require more resources
to set up and at equilibrium. In this subsection we show that
the extra resources required to set up Path-Segment contract
systems may be necessary in order to provide better guar-
antees to the source of traffic. Examples mentioned above
show that Pairwise-Exchange contract systems satisfy nei-
ther one of the definitions of successful mechanism design
for contract systems with accountability because in situa-
tions where s may have enough resources to pay for a path
Ps→d it might not be always able to purchase this connec-
tivity due to depeering. We see how these examples would
never happen in Path-Segment contract systems where s can
negotiate each flow separately.
LEMMA 3. Requiring entities to negotiate Pairwise-
Exchange contracts with per-flow granularity is a necessary
and sufficient condition to prevent contractual failures in
Pairwise-Exchange contract systems.
THEOREM 3.3. Contract systems based on Pairwise-
Exchange contracts that require negotiation at per-flow
granularity meet definition of successful mechanism design
with link-level accountability and proportional payments.
Even if the requirement to negotiate Pairwise-Exchange
contracts per flow is adopted, meeting success definition
for contract systems with link-level accountability and all-
or-nothing contract systems is not possible for Pairwise-
Exchange contract systems because no participant including
the CM in such systems accounts for the overall quality of a
path Ps→d, only quality of adjacent neighbors is monitored.
THEOREM 3.4. Requiring the CM to monitor the quality of
overall flow paths is a necessary and sufficient condition for
contract systems based on Pairwise-Exchange contracts that
require negotiation at per-flow granularity to meet definition
of successful mechanism design with link-level accountabil-
ity and all-or-nothing payments.
Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 show that with some modifications
Pairwise-Exchange contract systems may achieve compa-
rable level of guarantee as Path-Segment contract systems
at the expense of extra resources. Nevertheless, Pairwise-
Exchange intrinsically cannot provide the level of choice of
service level to the source that Path-Segment contracts do.
4. Attacks and Defenses
This section discusses possible issues when nodes collude
to gain and/or behave maliciously in order to gain profit
in the short or long run. We start by describing attacks
that stem from the fact that it may be profitable for par-
ticipants to lie about their resources and behavior, and we
suggest possible remedies by specifying what the bandwidth
commitments and penalties should be for Path-Segment and
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Pairwise-Exchange contract systems respecting the success
definitions presented in Section 2.4. We finish on a negative
note by showing why depeering cannot be prevented in the
face of participants whose utility to do malice is unknown.
4.1 False Advertisements
We describe an attack that Pairwise-Exchange contract
systems may be vulnerable to, unlike Path-Segment contract
systems, and motivate the need for mechanisms to construct
penalties that could prevent this attack.
For some path Ps→d, bandwidth costs increase at some
node, and this increase begins to propagate in the direction
of the source. Let us assume that Ps→d is the only path from
s to d. Let us look at the strategy space of some node ni on
the path of the propagation of the bandwidth cost increase:
1. increase its bandwidth cost ci, thereby contributing to
the propagation;
2. depeer from ni+1 if ni expects to lose money from this
peering;
3. decrease the amount of traffic that passes through ni
along Ps→d by dropping any excess.
Strategy 3 yields an attack where some intermediary node
drops s’s traffic without s even being warned because s never
notices the price increase. To prevent this attack it is enough
for the CM to ensure during the negotiations stage that penal-
ties for each node are higher than that node’s forwarding cost
(see 4.2 for ways to ensure this). Neither of the strategies (1-
3) of ni makes sense in Path-Segment contract systems be-
cause ci is not directly related to ci+1, since ni does not have
a direct contract with ni+1, in Path-Segment contract sys-
tems the source will never be left blind with respect to band-
width cost increases. The latter holds because the source is
required to purchase the whole path Ps→d thereby inevitably
finding out the bandwidth cost of each link on Ps→d. There-
fore, this scenario does not happen in Path-Segment contract
systems.
4.2 The Right Commitments and Penalties
In this subsection we discuss two attacks in order to mo-
tivate mechanisms for specifying bandwidth commitments
and penalties which we present at the end of this subsection.
Our analysis of contract systems assumes that s is trusted.
However, in link-level accountability settings, were we to re-
lax this assumption, in cases where s can make more money
by lying about sending traffic and collecting penalties from
n1 than from sending messages to the destination d, s would
rather lie. To address this issue the CM must make sure that
s’s utility for every batch that reaches d is higher than what
s could gain form penalties of nodes it has contracts with.
However, this is very challenging to achieve if s’s valuation
of each successful delivery is different, so we are going to
assume that ui = uj 6=i ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
With link-level accountability, a source s may gain profit
by colluding with a forwarding node ni if blaming a neigh-
bor of ni could yield a positive profit in penalties that s and
ni could split. Let us assume that
Cj
m < cj for j = i − 1
or j = i + 1 (depending on whom s colludes with). In
Pairwise-Exchange contract systems, this collusion attack
can be done only in groups of three adjacent nodes. The
left-most node in the group colludes with one other node
in the group against the third one in the group. For Path-
Segment contract systems with link-level accountability the
two nodes that share the faulty link must pay for them-
selves and the rest of the path to compensate for s’s ex-
penses. Without loss of generality let us say that s col-
ludes with ni to drop packets and blame ni+1. Then, in
a fair-penalty case, the CM must collect ni’s and ni+1’s


















tively. Thus, to prevent collusion the CM could simply


















m , ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ `. However this con-
dition is impossible to meet when ` < 4 for Path-Segment
contract systems, which implies that it is impossible to meet
for Pairwise-Exchange contract systems in general.
To prevent collusion, the CM must ensure that every en-
tity’s commitments and every forwarding node’s penalties
render collusion and dropping traffic in general unprofitable.
To defend against these attacks we, first, propose that a
commitment must be equal to the total cost of bandwidth,
Ci = mci ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ `, for both Path-Segment and Pairwise-
Exchange contract systems. This prevents the attack de-
scribed in the paragraph above. Also, for Path-Segment con-
tract systems, ni’s penalty must be at least Cim = ci in ad-
dition to some fraction ηi < 1 of s’s minimum settlement
εs
m per batch and some fraction of the path excluding itself
and the other node sharing the faulty link. For settings with
link-level accountability, this ensures that both nodes shar-
ing the faulty link, say ni and ni+1, pay for the whole path
in addition to a fraction ηi+ηi+1m <
1
m of s’s minimum set-
tlement εsm per batch. For Pairwise-Exchange contract sys-
tems, we require that every node ni who can claim ship-
ment (see Claiming Shipment Rule, Section 2.3.1) obtains
payment equal to commitment Ci+1m in addition to a fraction
ηi < 1 of
εni
m per batch from ni+1 if ni+1 shares the faulty









and Cim + ηi−1εni−1 re-
spectively, so to make it unfavorable for nodes to drop traf-
fic and to prevent the attack presented in Section 4.1 it is
sufficient for εni > ηiεni − ηi−1εni−1 to hold. This con-
dition is trivially satisfied as long as CM makes sure that
0 < ηi < 1 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ `. For both Path-Segment and
Pairwise-Exchange contract systems it is important that the
overall profit an entity may gain from penalties is less than
that entity’s minimum settlement, otherwise an entity could
simply not send anything and make at least its minimum set-
tlement from collected penalties by blaming the next node
down stream. Enforcing this condition for each entity dur-
ing the negotiations stage while not knowing that entity’s
minimum settlement directly is a challenge that we have not
yet encountered a solution to.
4.3 Malicious Intent
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Although we have presented sufficient conditions for func-
tional contract systems where nodes are discouraged from
being faulty, our model does not address two important is-
sues for settings with link-level accountability: out of mal-
ice (i) forwarding nodes may selectively drop traffic of non-
adjacent competitors and blame neighbors for poor quality,
and (ii) forwarding nodes may have incentive for destroy-
ing adjacent competitors’ reputation by dropping traffic and
blaming that adjacent node for poor quality. Both cases may
result in depeering. In Pairwise-Exchange contract systems
depeering is achieved by at least one neighbor refusing to
establish a Pairwise-Exchange contract with the malicious
party, and in Path-Segment contract systems depeering is
achieved by an entity refusing to advertise the link that con-
nects it to the malicious party. Some participants may have
incentive for doing (i), (ii), or both regardless of what the
penalties are if such actions may be of profit in the long run
or simply out of malicious intent. The biggest disadvan-
tage of Pairwise-Exchange systems is that in the face of
attacks motivated by irrational malicious intent s never
gets reimbursed. The CM cannot provide incentive for ma-
licious parties to meet contractual obligations because it has
no way of figuring out how to penalize them. While there
seems to be no solution for case (ii), case (i) can be addressed
as follows. Each forwarding node could verifiably encrypt
(e.g. [7]) each packet prior to forwarding it to the next node
on the path and require proof of receipt before revealing the
decryption key. Overall, this procedure works only as long
as for every node there is a traffic flow which would result in
an overall loss were that node to drop it, so penalties should
heavily depend on the source of the traffic. The latter prop-
erty is intrinsic to Path-Segment contract systems because in
such systems negotiations are performed at per-flow granu-
larity and penalties are high enough to pay for the whole flow
path in addition to a fraction of the source’s minimum settle-
ment. This, however, does not hold for Pairwise-Exchange
contracts because, as we saw in Section 3.3, negotiations do
not distinguish quality of service at flow granularity. Mod-
ification that allows Pairwise-Exchange contracts be nego-
tiable at per-flow granularity, as discussed in Section 3.3.3
provides parties involved in Pairwise-Exchange contract sys-
tems with a way to resolve issue (i).
5. Related Work
There has been much work related to accountability and
incentive mechanism design on the Internet. We discuss re-
cent research in the areas of network accountability and fault
localization, followed by a review of related work in price
and incentive mechanism design for wireless as well as wire-
line networks.
5.0.0.1 Accountability and Fault Localization.
In [23] and [8], use of encryption and multi-path routing
was proposed to guarantee delivery of packets and prevent-
ing failures. Were these proposals not too impractical with
respect to computation and bandwidth overhead, account-
ability and contract policing would not be an important is-
sues.
A secure quality monitoring and link-level fault localiza-
tion mechanism proposed by Avramopoulos and Rexford,
called stealth probing [4], uses a combination of active prob-
ing via IPsec technology and byzantine tomography (net-
work tomography used to identify faulty links with probing).
Unfortunately, stealth probing is impractical as it requires
encryption of all traffic. Secure Traceroute, a link-level ac-
countability scheme, based on marking packets as probes via
secret identifiers, is presented in [22]. Argyraki et al. present
in [3] another link-level accountability scheme AudIt, where
each AD sends feedback per flow to traffic sources regarding
loss and delay. As pointed out in [5], the major problem with
these two approaches is that an adversary could frame any
AD by dropping that AD’s feedback. Barak et al. propose
yet another link-level accountability scheme that is secure
even in the presence of adversaries [5]. This scheme relies
on the assumptions that there is only a single adversary, com-
munication channels are single bi-directional paths, and that
sources and destinations trust each other. This accountabil-
ity scheme has a similar weakness as Secure Traceroute and
AudIt with respect to multiple indenpendent adversaries (see
our technical report for further treatment [29]). The reader
should note that all three accountability schemes [3, 5, 22]
suffer from the absence of trusted channels between enti-
ties, something we believe to be necessary for successful
accountability systems in presence of multiple independent
adversaries. For our work we assume that every participant
must have a trusted channel with the trusted authority, the
CM, in order to avoid this issue.
5.0.0.2 Price and Mechanism Design.
In [20] the use of Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mecha-
nism was shown by Nisan and Ronen to accurately solve the
shortest-path problem with selfish nodes, and later mecha-
nisms based on VCG have been proposed for lowest-cost
routing in wireline and wireless networks in [11] and [2], re-
spectively. While the mechanism discussed in [11] is mostly
based on BGP where all pairs of nodes want to commu-
nicate, the mechanism developed in [2] is appropriate for
ad hoc networks where not all pairs of nodes may want to
communicate and is more targeted towards forming com-
plete paths. In SPRITE [28], the authors present a payment
mechanism for wireless setting where every node is discour-
aged from being dishonest. MINT, a market design based on
continuous double auction administered by a mediator along
with a suite of routing protocols is proposed in [26].
Valancius et al. show that in MINT, ISP’s and edge net-
works can make bids regarding desired connectivity as buy-
ers, and they can make advertisements regarding available
bandwidth as sellers to a central authority. The latter is re-
sponsible for matching demand of buyers with suitable sup-
ply of sellers such that buyers end up purchasing a single
path with satisfactory characteristics. Assuming support of
a central trusted authority in MINT makes its market frame-
work very helpful in establishing contract systems, and, as
detailed in Section 2, we use this assumption in our models.
Neither of these mechanisms has yet been analyzed by the
research community with respect to different accountability
settings. In [9] it was shown by Elkind et al. that any truth-
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ful mechanism for purchasing a shortest path may require
the buyer to pay possibly more than twice the cost of that
shortest path. However, we do not consider the problem of
truthfulness in price negotiations to be related to our study
as long as participants do not advertise resources they do not
possess. This is because our objective is to ensure that nodes
are not faulty with respect to traffic, regardless of whether
these nodes advertise their true bandwidth costs honestly.
The most related study to our work is by Laskowski and
Chuang where the authors show that without a proper ac-
countability framework innovation and optimal routes on the
Internet are impossible [16]. Laskowski and Chuang pro-
pose a general node-level accountability framework that em-
ploys trusted entities that monitor the quality and optimality
of each path in order to enforce accountability and ensure
path optimality at equilibrium for pairwise contract systems.
Presence of such monitors renders the problem of fault lo-
calization trivial, but the implementation of such monitors
in real life is impractical. Also, the node-level accountability
scheme proposed in [16] does not focus on fault-localization
per se, and it is proven to work only under the assumption
that there can be only one adversary (or a single contiguous
collusion of adversaries) on a path, a weakness we address in
our technical report [29]. We do not focus on node-level ac-
countability due to its impracticality and instead assume ex-
istence of a link-level accountability scheme secure against
multiple independent adversaries. Also, instead of concen-
trating on path optimality we address the issue of entities
meeting a promised level of service when forwarding traffic
along a
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In order for network administrative domains to have in-
centives to fulfill their promises to their business partners, in
this work we have, first, motivated the need for network ad-
ministrative domains to formalize business agreements into
concrete contracts and, second, to use accountability frame-
works in order to make contracts enforceable. We review our
contributions. We formally define path-based contracts and
pairwise contracts, and we present sufficient conditions for
path-based contract systems and accountability frameworks
that guarantee networks along a path have an incentive to
meet their respective contractual obligations. We show that
pairwise contract systems may suffer from depeering in situ-
ations with available bandwidth and sufficient demand, fail-
ures path-based contracts are safe from, and propose suffi-
cient modifications for preventing such failures in pairwise
contract systems and show that pairwise contract systems
may meet the same level of guarantee as path-based con-
tract systems at extra computational cost. We present condi-
tions for path-based and pairwise contract systems sufficient
to allow only a constant amount of monitoring for every par-
ticipant to make a positive profit at an equilibrium where
participants are discouraged from being faulty. We present
examples of attacks of selfish but rational entities for path-
based and pairwise contract systems and propose solutions
to these attacks. Lastly, we discuss possibly unpreventable
issue of malicious parties causing depeering in pairwise and
path-based contract systems, and we show that path-based
contracts allow the sender of traffic to get reimbursed which
cannot be guaranteed for pairwise contract systems.
For future work we leave the following problems: design-
ing an incentive mechanism and analyzing contract systems
that are not limited to a single path; designing a negotiation
scheme that minimizes the number of negotiation rounds be-
fore either a contract can be established or an incompatibility
is found; presenting minimal requirements for a node-level
accountability and/or link-level accountability schemes as-
suming multiple independent adversaries.
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A. Sketch of a Proof of Shipment Protocol
and Vulnerabilities of Some Accountabil-
ity Schemes
A.1 Proofs of Shipment
Let us define procedure ProofOfShipment(x,m, y) as a
procedure that consists of an entity x sending a message m
to y distinct neighbors followed by receiving and recording
the proof of receipt of this message by at least one neighbor.
ProofOfShipment() can be used by any participant of the
network to obtain a proof of shipment of a message by ac-
quiring a proof of receipt of that message from at least one
of its neighbors. In practice a secure summarization pro-
cedure, such as the one presented in [12], could be used to
generate proofs of receipt. This idea is similar to what has
been proposed in [23] and [8] in order to guarantee delivery
of packets at the cost of very high computation and band-
width overhead. The main weakness of this approach are it is
wasteful in terms of bandwidth and computation and that the
number of a participant’s neighbors that lie along the path of
that participant’s particular client may be too small to make
this procedure effective.
ProofOfShipment(x, b, 1) where the single node that is
responsible for providing a proof of shipment is the next
node on the path contract who can provide proof of receipts,
can be used by entity x to provide proof of shipment of a
batch b. In cases the next node on the path does not coop-
erate, that node and its preceding node are localized. Also,
when a participant lies about forwarding a message, this par-
ticipant and the next node downstream are localized. In or-
der to for ProofOfShipment to be functional there must
exist a trusted channel between the entity that is providing a
proof and the verifier. This is an issue that is not addressed
in [3, 5] (see Section A.2 for examples of attacks), but that
we address by assuming a trusted between each entity and
the CM.
A security weakness of ProofOfShipment procedure in
link-level accountability settings stems from nodes having
a possibility of issuing false proofs of receipt. For exam-
ple, when destination d is not trusted, to get paid εd d may
wish to provide acknowledgment even to batches it did not
receive. A possible solution to this issue is to adopt a secure
procedure for proving receipt of shipment (e. g. secure sum-
marization [12]). Also, in order to prevent forwarding nodes
from not issuing acknowledgments of receipt altogether, a
rule that no node can get paid for a forwarded message un-
less it provides both proof of receipt and proof of shipment
(proof of receipt from the next node downstream) of that
message can be adopted. The latter is a rephrasing of the
2.3.1 which is mentioned explicitly in Section 2.3.1.
A.2 Vulnerability of Schemes Presented in [5,
16] With Respect to Multiple Independent
Adversaries
The accountability scheme presented by Laskowski and
Chuang in [16] assumes a single adversary. At a very high
level, it works by having a trusted contractual monitor on
each node of a path in order to make sure that nodes only for-
ward traffic to hops that meet certain optimality constraints
agreed upon in advance. At the beginning, the source is
promised by its service provider connectivity to certain des-
tinations at certain optimality level, that source’s service
provider is promised a similar deal from its own service
provider, and so on and so forth. When the source’s traf-
fic is treated with suboptimal quality, which can be detected
with aid of trusted contractual monitors, the source penal-
izes its service provider. The latter in turn penalizes its ser-
vice provider, and so on and so forth until this penalty wave
reaches the faulty node. At this point the latter node cannot
penalize any one down stream, so it must incur losses due
to its deviation from contractual agreements. When the only
obligation of service providers is to route traffic towards the
next hop on the most optimal route, this scheme works as-
suming that traffic does not come back from a suboptimal
path to an optimal path before it reaches the destination. In
presence of multiple adversaries who may intentionally de-
lay or add jitter to traffic, however, only the adversary closest
to the source will be punished as there is no mechanism for
propagating penalties beyond this point for such type of ma-
licious behavior.
At a high level, the scheme presented in [5] by Barak et al.
works as follows. Each node on a path forms a quality of
service report and sends it to the source in an onion fashion.
If reports of two adjacent nodes disagree, a faulty link is lo-
calized. The nature of the onion report ensures that an adver-
sary cannot implicate any particular participant by dropping
a report. However, in presence of multiple adversaries, it is
enough for one adversary to drop these onion reports in or-
der for the source to have no knowledge regarding any other
adversary and the quality of the path down stream from the
one who drops onion reports. For path-based contract sys-
tems such a simple attack makes it hard for the source to
decide whether the nodes down stream from the adversary
who drops the reports should get paid or penalized.
B. Analysis of Path-Segment Contract System
with Node-Level Accountability and Proofs
from Sections 3.2- 3.3
B.1 Success of Path-Segment Contracts with
Node-Level Accountability and Propor-
tional Payments
In the case that the CM has capability of correctly determin-
ing the precise amount of parts that each forwarding node
forwards for every round of the game, node-level account-
ability is guaranteed. In this setting the CM is capable of
determining whether a forwarding node is faulty or not, for
every forwarding node in the game, and administer payment
or punishment accordingly. If an agreement is reached, in
the negotiations stage s must make a commitment Ci to
each node ni, and, as noted in Section 5, Ci should equal
to mci tiN . This commitment assumes that ni at least meets
its threshold, but s must agree to pay ciN for each extra part
that ni forwards beyond ti. Expected profit equation of for-
warding node ni is:
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E[πni ] = mci
ti
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ξi3 = mσi(0|ϕi−1 ≥ ti−1).
This equation is the difference between what ni is expected
to earn by exceeding ti when ni+1 acknowledges nis for-
warding actions during forwarding stage in addition to what
ni gains from ss commitment to nis bandwidth in the ne-
gotiations stage and nis expected marginal forwarding costs
in addition to expected penalties when ni is unable to prove
that it meets contractual obligations. For each forwarding
node ni the optimal distribution σi should maximize ξi1 and




σi−1(ϕi−1 = ϕi)(ϕi − ti), and make sure
that ξi3 = 0 when
ti
N [ci − fi] + pi > 0 and vice versa. Also,
in the former case, for ni to make money ci must be greater
than fi.
Expected profit equation of source s is:















This equation is the difference between what s is expected
to earn from penalties of forwarding nodes in Ps→d when
they are unable to prove that they meet contractual obliga-
tions in addition to the expected overall utility of batches in
b reaching d and what s is expected to pay to all forward-
ing nodes s has Path-Segment contract with when they ex-
ceed their respective thresholds in addition to ss commit-
ment to their bandwidth. In the case that every ni meets
ti for every batch in b, the optimal values of σ0 are 1
when
∑m




N ) and 0 oth-





N fi when σ0 = 1 and 0 otherwise. Say
at least one forwarding node found that it is best for it not to
meet its threshold; without loss of generality let us say that












and 0 otherwise. In this situation the total system profit is 0
regardless of the value of σ0.
LEMMA 4. If
∑m





there is a bandwidth price setting c = 〈c1, c2, ..., c`〉 that
yields an equilibrium where at least t parts of all m batches
reach d in the expected case and s as well as each node on




i=1 ui ≥ εs +
∑`
i=1 εi + m
∑`
i=1 fi implies
that we can find a price vector c = 〈c1, c2, ..., c`〉 such that∑m
i=1 ui ≥ εs +m
∑`
i=1 ci and ci ≥ fi + εni ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ `
e.g.












If every forwarding node meets its threshold, this yields an
overall positive profit for s, d and every forwarding node ni








`+1 . Thus, the condition ci > fi
holds ∀1 ≤ i ≤ ` and every forwarding node ni will try to
forward every part of every batch that s sends so s will send
every batch in b. Since even in the worst case of general net-
work failures such as congestion each node should be able to
meet its corresponding threshold by Assumption 1, at least t
parts should reach d in the expected case. 
THEOREM B.1. Path-Segment contract systems meet def-
inition of successful mechanism design with node-level ac-
countability and proportional payments.
Proof.
Provided that a node-level accountability framework ef-
fective against multiple independent adversaries is estab-
lished and that penalties are high enough to cover all of
s’s aggregate expected contractual spending in addition to
εs (see Sections 3.1 and 4.2), Lemma 4 shows that Path-
Segment contract systems satisfy success definition for con-
tract systems with link-level accountability for proportional
payments.

To show that Path-Segment contract systems satisfy suc-
cess definition for contract systems with node-level account-
ability and all-or-nothing payments the same logic as the
proof of Theorem 3.1 can be used.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. When d is trusted or encouraged to acknowledge
everything that n` forwards and c` > f`, n` will be dis-
couraged from not meeting its threshold t` = t. Similar
argument follows for the rest of the nodes by using back-
ward induction, where n` is the base case, keeping in mind
that each node ni will be discouraged from not meeting its
corresponding threshold. The latter is true because every
node ni is encouraged to forward everything that ni receives








that we can find a price vector c = 〈c1, c2, ..., c`〉 such that
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∑m
i=1 ui ≥ εs + εd +m
∑`
i=1 ci and ci ≥ fi + εni ∀ 1 ≤
i ≤ ` e.g.












If every forwarding node meets its threshold, this yields
an overall positive profit for s, d and every forwarding node








`+2 . Thus, every forwarding
node ni will try to forward every part of every batch that s
sends and s will send every batch in b. Since even in the
worst case of general network failures such as congestion
each node should be able to meet its corresponding thresh-
old by Assumption 1 (unintentional drops), at least t parts
should reach d in the expected case. 
Proof. [Proof of Theorem 3.1]. Provided that a link-level ac-
countability framework effective against multiple indepen-
dent adversaries is established and that penalties are high
enough to cover all of s’s aggregate expected contractual
spending in addition to εs (see Sections 3.1 and 4.2),
Lemma 1 shows that Path-Segment contract systems sat-
isfy success definition for contract systems with link-level
accountability and proportional payments. 
B.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. When d is encouraged to acknowledge everything
that n` forwards and c` > f`, n` will be discouraged from
not meeting its threshold t` = t. The last node n` is also
discouraged from forwarding more than t parts to d because
such strategy will result in higher forwarding cost while
yielding the same reward as for forwarding only t parts.
Similar argument follows for the rest of the nodes using in-
verse induction. However, every node is interested in send-
ing as little as possible in order to reduce forwarding cost.
Since pia < pib for every node ni, when cheating, no node
ni wants to be blamed for not receiving at least ti−1 packets;
ni loses less when it is able to blame the next node down-
stream which ni can do only if ni can prove that it received
at least ti−1 parts, according to 2.3.1 (see Section 2.3.1).
Therefore, if every node meets its threshold it is guaranteed
to get paid tiN ci. However, if σ`(ϕ` ≥ t|t ≤ ϕi < ti) = 1,
then it does not make sense for ni to meet its threshold as
it is guaranteed to get paid while decreasing its marginal
forward costs. By Assumption 1, every node ni has a non-
trivial probability of unintentionally dropping ti−ti−1 pack-
ets due to general network failures such as congestion, which
means that there must be non-trivial probability that every
node ni unintentionally drops ti − ti−1 packets of a specific
message. This implies that there is non-trivial probability
that more than N − t packets of a message get dropped if
at least one node does not meet its threshold. Therefore,
σ`(ϕ` ≥ t|ϕi) < 1 ∀ t ≤ ϕi < ti holds ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ `, and in
order to encourage ni to meet ti it must be the case that:
ti
N




















and ϕi < ti. Note that this equation can-
not be satisfied if σ`(ϕ` ≥ t|t ≤ ϕi < ti) = 1. Since∑m
i=1 ui > m
∑`
i=1 fi, we know from the proof of Lemma
1 that we can find ci > fi for every forwarding node ni
(assuming non-zero minimum settlements for each node).
Therefore, it is sufficient to have
ϕi
ti









ci, ∀ t ≤ ϕi < ti.
The CM can ensure that this condition is met by increasing
pia . When this condition is met, min(’1’, ’2’, ’3’) is ’1’
and every node ni will be willing meet ti exactly. Therefore
s will send every batch in b, and exactly t parts of every
batch in b will make it to d. Computation of the profit of
each forwarding node including d is the same as in the proof
of the previous claim. Since penalties are distributed only
when ϕ` < t, the CM has to perform only a single check
every round to make sure that d receives at least t parts of
every batch. The CM’s direct manipulation of pia may not
be necessary when σ`(ϕ` ≥ t|ϕi) is low and the latter is
reasonable to assume considering that all forwarding nodes
are selfish and do not trust each other. 
Proof. [Proof of Theorem 3.2] Is analogous to the proof of
Theorem 3.1 
B.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. If such requirement was not necessary, then there
must exist at least one solution to contractual failure when
connectivity is purchased for at least two distinct flows at
one price without making these flows distinguishable. How-
ever, as the examples in Section 3.3 show, even with only
as many as two flows depeering may occur when entities are
unable to negotiate bandwidth costs per flow.
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Prior to showing why this requirement is sufficient in gen-
eral, let us first show why it is sufficient for the examples
described in Section sec:PairwiseFail. In the first example
if every node could negotiate contracts per each flow, then
no estimation would be necessary because every node will
have negotiated the exact rate at which traffic will be sent
for each flow. In the second example, as long as each source
can negotiate contracts withX on per-flow basis s1 will have
chosen to pay for 1 unit only to D1 and s1<i≤n will have
chosen to pay for 1 unit each only to D2. No depeering will
take place and X will have made a positive profit of ncx.
Before going any further we note that for a forwarding
node ni to request a proof of shipment from ni+1 of a
batch for a particular flow, prior establishment of a Pairwise-
Exchange contract between ni and ni+1 for that specific
flow is necessary.
For the sake of contradiction say that each node is required
to negotiate Pairwise-Exchange contracts at per-flow granu-
larity, there is an available flow path Ps→d, and s has enough
funds to pay each node along Ps→d at least that node’s min-
imum settlement in addition to that node’s forwarding cost,
but s is unable to reach d because ni and ni+1 decide to de-
peer. We will consider this decision from ni’s point of view.
For ni exchanging flows may be unprofitable when either (i)
ni is unable to meet
∑`
j=i+1 fj + εj or (ii) ni+1 is asking ni
for more than
∑`
j=i+1 fj + εj . In the scenario (i), it must be
the case that ni−1 cannot meet
∑`
j=i fj + εj , which in turn
implies that ni−2 cannot meet
∑`
j=i−1 fj + εj , and so on
until the implication that s is unable to meet
∑`
j=1 fj + εj
is reached. Thus scenario (i) leads to a contradiction. In
the scenario (ii), asking for too much from ni, ni+1 ends up
making no profit, whereas it could make at least εni+1 were
ni+1 to ask for no more than
∑`
j=i+1 fj + εj . Thus case (ii)
contradicts the assumption that every participant is rational.

B.5 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof.
Let us begin this proof by showing why Pairwise-
Exchange contract systems that require negotiation at per-
flow granularity meet the last part of the definition of suc-
cessful mechanism design with link-level accountability and
proportional payments. When an agreement is reached in the
negotiations stage, s makes a commitment of C1 = mc1 t1N
to the first forwarding node on Ps→d, and s pays c1N for each
extra part that n1 forwards beyond t1. Similarly, every for-
warding node ni ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1 makes a commitment of
Ci+1 = mci+1
ti+1
N to the next node on Ps→d, and ni pays
ni+1
c1
N for each extra part that ni+1 forwards beyond ti+1.
Thus, the expected profit of a forwarding node ni is:
E[πni ] = [forwarding gains]− [bandwidth costs]−













+ ξ(i+1)1 · ci+1
]
−[ξi2 · fi + ξi3 · pia +
σi(0|ϕi−1 ≥ ti−1)[λia(ϕi ≥ ti)pia +
λib(ϕi−1 < ti−1)pib ] +




















Here ξ(i+1)1 is defined analogously to ξi1 . This equation
is exactly the same as the one for Path-Segment contract sys-
tems with the exception that each forwarding node ni must
also pay to ni+1 for connectivity. Sufficient condition for ni
to forward traffic and make positive profit is for the expected
gains that ni makes from properly forwarding nthi−1 traffic
to be larger than the losses it may incur due to penalties, its
own forwarding costs, and what ni has to pay ni+1. Just as
for the Path-Segment scenario, an important aspect of E[πni ]
is that the profit of ni depends on the strategies of its neigh-
bors. There is nothing ni can do if ni−1 lies about forward-
ing at least ti−1 parts, and if ni does not have any confidence
in ni+1, then ni would forward nothing to prevent fruitless
forwarding costs. Therefore, sufficient incentive mechanism
must provide ni with confidence in its neighbors, specifi-
cally for ni to be sure that ni+1 acknowledges everything
that ni forwards to ni+1.
Say t is the expected amount of parts of any batch in b that
Ps→d can deliver from s to d, given that s sends outN parts.
The expected profit of the source s is:
















mσ1(0|ϕ0 = N)p11 .
This equation is exactly the same as the one for Path-
Segment contract systems with the exception that s pays
to and is able to obtain penalties from only n1 (see de-
tails on penalties in Section 4.2). If s has high confi-
dence in that ϕ` ≥ t, then it is sufficient for
∑m
i=1 ui ≥
εs + ξ11c1 + mc1
t1
N for s to have incentive to send traffic
via reimbursements. If s has no confidence in that ϕ` ≥ t,
if at least one forwarding node nj found that it is best for it
not to forward, then there is nothing s can do unless j = 1
19
in which case s can send traffic and make money only if
mc1
ti
N + ξ11c1 < mpia .
To ensure that s can make positive profit, the CM must en-
force penalties to be higher than all of s’s expected marginal
costs over the whole path Ps→d (see Section 4.2 for further
detail), which means that every node’s penalty must be at
least its forwarding cost. This condition ensures that for no
node will it be profitable to advertise bandwidth it does not
have, assuming that no forwarding node ni will agree to a
bandwidth cost ci lower than its forwarding cost fi. If we
assume that s is trusted, then pia should be higher than all of
s’s expected marginal costs.
Equation for E[πs] shows that it might be profitable for
s to to send less than its threshold towards d in case
σ`(ϕ` > t|ϕ0 < N) is consistently close to 1. While obtain-
ing only a constant utility uj for each batch bj ∈ b when at
least t parts of bj reach d, s must pay n1 extra for each part
of bj that n1 forwards in excess of t1 parts. However, by the
Claiming Shipment Rule (see Section 2.3.1) in this scenario
n1 would not be able to get paid which would cause it to
drop every batch to prevent fruitless forwarding costs. From
penalties, s would not be able to profit at least its minimum
settlement εs due to the structure of penalties as presented in
Section 4.2. Therefore, being rational, s would rather send
out exactly N parts for each batch.
The following claim shows that Pairwise-Exchange con-
tract systems that require negotiation at per-flow granularity
meet the last part of the definition of successful mechanism
design with link-level accountability and proportional pay-
ments.
Claim: For Pairwise-Exchange contract systems that re-
quire negotiation at per flow granularity, if d is trusted or
encouraged with payment εdm to acknowledge receipt of ϕ`





i=0 εi + m
∑`
i=1 fi, and ci − fi ≥
ci+1 + εni ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ `, then there is an equilibrium band-
width price setting c = 〈c1, c2, ..., c`〉 such that t parts of ev-
ery batch in b reach d in the expected case, and each element
of Ps→d makes a positive profit no less than its respective
minimum settlement.
Proof of Claim:
When d is trusted or encouraged to acknowledge every-
thing that n` forwards and c` > f`, n` will be discour-
aged from not meeting its threshold t` = t. Similar ar-
gument follows for the rest of the nodes by using back-
ward induction, where n` is the base case, keeping in mind
that each node ni will be discouraged from not meeting its
corresponding threshold. The latter is true because every
node ni is encouraged to forward everything that ni receives





i=0 εi + m
∑`
i=1 fi im-
plies that negotiations can result in a bandwidth-cost vector
c = 〈c1, c2, ..., c`〉 such that
∑m
i=1 ui ≥ εs+εd+m
∑`
i=1 ci
and ci ≥ fi + εni ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ ` e.g.












This can be achieved during the negotiations as follows.
First, s establishes a Pairwise-Exchange contract with n1
to forward s’s traffic towards d. The most n1 can bar-
gain out of s is
∑m





Second, in order to forward s’s traffic properly, n1 estab-
lishes a Pairwise-Exchange contract with n2 to forward s’s
traffic towards d. The most n2 can bargain out of n1 is∑m




i=2 εi. This goes
on until n` is reached who has to bargain with d to obtain
acknowledgments. The most n` can bargain out of n`−1 for







f` + εn` + εd. Thus, n` will have enough funds to bargain
with d acknowledgments. Note that s pays every node along
Ps→d by paying n1. If every forwarding node meets its
threshold, this yields an overall positive profit for s, d and
every forwarding node ni no less than their respective min-








Thus, every forwarding node ni will try to forward every
part of every batch that s sends, s will send N parts of every
batch in b, and the expected amount of parts t of every batch
in b will reach d. 
Provided that a link-level accountability framework is ef-
fective against multiple independent adversaries is estab-
lished and that penalties are more than needed to cover all
of s’s aggregate expected contractual spending (see Sections
3.1 and 4.2), this claim shows that Pairwise-Exchange con-
tract systems with the requirement to negotiate contracts at
per-flow granularity satisfy definition of successful mecha-
nism design with link-level accountability and proportional
payments.

B.6 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Proof. This requirement is necessary, because without it
there is no way for the CM to check quality of an overall
path, and, since the CM is the only entity with authority to
check proofs of receipt, it is the CM who must monitor over-
all path quality. To begin the proof of why this condition is
sufficient, we note that simply if the CM has a record of each
flow, then for each flow path it can check how many parts per
round a destination of that flow path obtains and act accord-
ing to whether it meets the overall path threshold. The latter,
s has no control over, and the CM must measure this quantity
separately for each flow.
We begin a more detailed treatment of the proof by show-
ing why Pairwise-Exchange contract systems that require
negotiation at per-flow granularity and require CM to moni-
tor the overall quality level of paths, meet the last part of the
definition of successful mechanism design with link-level
accountability and all-or-nothing payments. When an agree-
ment is reached in the negotiations stage, smakes a commit-
ment of C1 = mc1 t1N to the first forwarding node on Ps→d,
and every forwarding node ni ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ `−1 makes a com-
mitment of Ci+1 = mci+1
ti+1
N to the next node on Ps→d.
As long as ϕ` ≥ t, every node ni gets paid a fixed band-
width cost ci tiN , otherwise each node ni has to prove that it
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met its threshold ti in order to get paid. Say t is the amount
of parts of any batch in b that Ps→d can deliver from s to d
when all forwarding nodes cooperate, given that s sends out
N parts. The expected profit of a forwarding node ni is:
E[πni ] = [forwarding gains]− [bandwidth costs]−













− [ξi1 + ξi2 +
mσi(0|ϕi−1 ≥ ti−1)[λia(ϕi ≥ ti) ·
pia + λib(ϕi−1 < ti−1)pib ] +
mσi−1(ϕi−1 < ti−1)λ(i−1)a(ϕi−1 ≥ ti−1)pib ],






























and ξi2 = m
ti−1∑
ϕi=t
σi(ϕi)(λia(ϕi ≥ ti)pia +

























Note the use of Assumption 2 (independence) for profit
analysis. This equation is very similar to the one for propor-
tional payments; the differences are that ni’s gain is fixed to
the commitment that was made to it by ni−1 and ni’s band-
width cost to ni+1 is also fixed. Sufficient condition for ni
to forward traffic and make positive profit is for the expected
gains that ni makes from properly forwarding nthi−1 traffic
to be larger than the losses it may incur due to penalties, its
own forwarding costs, and what ni has to pay ni+1. Node’s
losses due to penalties depend on whether the final node n`
meets its threshold t, so besides ni’s confidence in its neigh-
bors, ni’s confidence in whether σ`(ϕ` > t) is high is impor-
tant. If σ`(ϕ` > t) is high, ni may be encouraged to forward
t ≤ ϕi ≤ ti in order to prevent extra losses due to forward-
ing. Therefore, sufficient incentive mechanism must provide
ni with confidence in its neighbors and make it unprofitable
to economize on forwarding costs.
Expected profit equation of s is:















mσ1(0|ϕ0 = N)p11 .
The main difference between this equation and that of
source’s profit in the proportional payments case is that in
the case of all-or-nothing payments the source does not have
to pay to forwarding nodes more than the commitment and
failure is addressed only when n` does not meet t. If s
has high confidence in that ϕ` ≥ t, then it is sufficient for∑m
i=1 ui ≥ εs + mc1
tj
N for s to send traffic and make pos-
itive profit. If s has no confidence in that ϕ` ≥ t, and if at
least one forwarding node nj found that it is best for it not
to forward, then there is nothing s can do unless j = 1, in
which case s can still have incentive to send traffic via reim-
bursement ifmc1 tiN +ξ11c1 < mpia . Just as for the scenario
with proportional payments, to ensure that s can make posi-
tive profit, the CM must enforce penalties to be higher than
all of s’s expected marginal costs over the whole path Ps→d
(see Section 4.2 for further detail), which means that every
node’s penalty must be at least that node’s forwarding cost.
This condition ensures that for no node will it be profitable
to advertise bandwidth it does not have, assuming that no
forwarding node ni will agree to a bandwidth cost ci lower
than its forwarding cost fi. If we assume that s is trusted,
then pia should be higher than all of s’s expected marginal
costs.
Claim: For Pairwise-Exchange contract systems that require
negotiation at per flow granularity and the CM to monitor
the overall path quality level, if d is trusted or encouraged
with payment εdm to acknowledge receipt of ϕ` parts from n`,
this information is known to every participant,
∑m
i=1 ui ≥∑`+1
i=0 εi + m
∑`
i=1 fi, and ci − fi ≥ ci+1 + εni ∀ 1 ≤
i ≤ `, then there is an equilibrium bandwidth price setting
c = 〈c1, c2, ..., c`〉 such that exactly t parts of every batch
in b reach d in the expected case, and each element of Ps→d
makes a positive profit no less than its respective minimum
settlement.
Proof of Claim (sketch): It was already shown that the re-
quirement for Pairwise-Exchange contacts to be established
per flow is sufficient for Pairwise-Exchange contract systems
to meet success definition with link-level accountability and
proportional payments. The proof of this claim given the
modification that the CM can monitor quality of each flow
path is analogous to proof of Lemma 2 keeping in mind
that d must be encouraged to provide proof of receipt of
batches from n`, pia < pib must hold (and it does by de-
fault because of the way penalties are structured in Pairwise-
Exchange contracts as discussed in Section 4.2), and the
necessary utility and price conditions,
∑m
j=1 ui > mc1 + εs
and ci− fi ≥ ci+1 + εni ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ `− 1 respectively, must
be met as mentioned in Section 3.3. 
Provided that a link-level accountability framework is ef-
fective against multiple independent adversaries is estab-
lished and that penalties are more than needed to cover all
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of s’s aggregate expected contractual spending (see Sections
3.1 and 4.2), this claim shows that Pairwise-Exchange con-
tract systems with the requirements to negotiate contracts
at per-flow granularity and for the CM to monitor overall
path quality satisfy definition of successful mechanism de-
sign with link-level accountability and all-or-nothing pay-
ments.

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